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In a California civil trial, anything a party said or wrote can be offered against that party over a hearsay objection under Evidence Code section 1220. The proponent does not have to show the statement was reliable, based on personal knowledge, or against interest when made: the only conditions are a statement by the declarant, offered against the declarant, in an action to which the declarant is a party. Section 1221 extends the same treatment to someone else’s statement that the party adopted by words or conduct, including by silence when the circumstances called for a denial. Neither section lets a party offer its own statements, and neither gets the evidence past section 352.
Evidence Code section 1220 reads in full:
“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party in either his individual or representative capacity, regardless of whether the statement was made in his individual or representative capacity.”
Section 1221 reads in full:
“Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.”
The section heading of 1220 says “Admission of party,” but the Supreme Court has held the heading irrelevant: the statute “refers to a ‘statement,’ not an ‘admission,'” and “[t]he hearsay rule does not compel exclusion of any statement offered against a party declarant, whether or not it can be described as an admission.” (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049.) The court repeated the point in People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 898, footnote 5, and People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 409.
That is the whole list. Clearing the hearsay rule “does not, of course, necessarily mean it was admissible” (Carpenter, at p. 1049): sections 352 and 1152 still apply, as covered below.
No, on all three.
Once admitted, the statement is substantive evidence, not just impeachment. Party admissions “constitute affirmative or substantive evidence that the jury or court may believe as against other evidence, including the party’s own contrary testimony on the stand.” (Jazayeri, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 325, quoting Witkin.)
The text answers it in both directions: the statement comes in against a party who is in the action “in either his individual or representative capacity, regardless of whether the statement was made in his individual or representative capacity.” A personal representative or trustee who sues or is sued in that capacity is a party in a representative capacity, and that person’s own statements, including ones made before the appointment in a purely personal capacity, are not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the party in that capacity. The reverse also holds.
Two neighbouring sections reach statements by someone who is not a party at all, and both matter in injury cases:
Both are one-way, like section 1220. The plaintiff cannot use them to put in the decedent’s or the child’s helpful statements.
It is another person’s statement that the party has made its own. “There are only two requirements for the introduction of adoptive admissions: ‘(1) the party must have knowledge of the content of another’s hearsay statement, and (2) having such knowledge, the party must have used words or conduct indicating his adoption of, or his belief in, the truth of such hearsay statement.'” (People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 623.) The statute “contemplates either explicit acceptance of another’s statement or acquiescence in its truth by silence or equivocal or evasive conduct.” (People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 843.)
Adoption changes whose credibility matters. “[O]nce the defendant has expressly or impliedly adopted the statements of another, the statements become his own admissions,” and “we are no longer concerned with the veracity or credibility of the original declarant.” (Silva, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 624.) The other person’s statement does not need its own hearsay exception.
Adoption by words is the easy case: the other driver says “you came out of nowhere” and the defendant answers “I know, I didn’t see you.” Adoption by an evasive answer is common on recordings. In Kincaid, the defendant repeatedly said he did not remember, never denied, and when asked if he was denying the accusations answered “No, I’m not denying.” The court held a jury could find adoption: “a reasonable person, when confronted with accusations of sexual abuse of his stepdaughter over an extended period of time, would do more than simply say that he did not remember.” (Kincaid, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.)
The Supreme Court’s formulation: if a person is accused “under circumstances which fairly afford him an opportunity to hear, understand, and to reply, and which do not lend themselves to an inference that he was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment …, and he fails to speak, or he makes an evasive or equivocal reply, both the accusatory statement and the fact of silence or equivocation may be offered as an implied or adoptive admission.” (People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308, 313-314; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189.) Broken into the foundation a trial judge will ask for:
The judge and jury split the work. “To warrant admissibility, it is sufficient that the evidence supports a reasonable inference that an accusatory statement was made under circumstances affording a fair opportunity to deny the accusation; whether defendant’s conduct actually constituted an adoptive admission becomes a question for the jury to decide.” (Zavala, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 779, quoting People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1011; applied in a civil case in Kincaid, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 83.) Where the evidence of the party’s condition conflicts, “the ultimate determination of that question … is up to the jury.” (Southers, supra, 191 Cal.App.2d at pp. 104-105.) A party who wants the jury told how to use the evidence should ask for the instruction: in Southers the jury was told it could not consider the statement “for any purpose” unless it found the plaintiff “heard, understood and agreed with” it.
Earlier denials do not end the inquiry. In Kincaid the defendant had denied the accusations on prior calls. The court held that “previous denials are not determinative when evaluating the admissibility of the statements at issue”; they are “a factor for the jury to consider.” (197 Cal.App.4th at p. 85.)
Yes, on the right facts, and the leading civil example is a traffic collision. In Southers v. Savage, the officer arrived shortly after the crash and asked the driver what happened. In front of his passenger, the driver said he thought he had passed the other car far enough to change lanes and had sideswiped it. The passenger, who sued claiming the other car sideswiped them, said nothing. The Court of Appeal held the evidence admissible: “evidence that immediately after the accident he sat supinely by when the driver of the car in which he was riding gave the officer a version of the accident completely contrary to that which Southers claims was the true version, and made no comment, was admissible.” (191 Cal.App.2d at pp. 103-105.) The fight in that case was over whether the passenger was conscious, and the jury resolved it. Southers predates the Evidence Code and is a Court of Appeal decision.
The limit comes from the same Supreme Court formulation: the circumstances must not “lend themselves to an inference that he was relying on the right of silence.” (Preston, supra, 9 Cal.3d at pp. 313-314.) The cases that develop that limit are criminal cases. In a civil trial the practical line follows the formulation: silence at the scene while one driver explains the crash to an officer is the Southers pattern; silence by a party who has been arrested, or who is being questioned as a suspect, gives the opponent its strongest argument against the foundation, because the circumstances themselves supply a reason other than agreement for saying nothing.
The driver at the scene. What a defendant driver told the officer, the other driver or a bystander comes in against that driver under section 1220. What the plaintiff said comes in against the plaintiff. In Carson, the plaintiff told the investigating officer he had crossed the intersection on his motorcycle and, looking back at his wife’s car, “knew then that she didn’t have enough time to make it.” The statement tended to rebut the claim that the other driver was negligent, and it was properly admitted against him. The trial judge had called it a declaration against interest; the Supreme Court said section 1230 could not apply because it “requires that the declarant be ‘unavailable as a witness,'” and the right ground was section 1220. (Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 848-850.) The officer’s report itself is a separate layer: see section 1280 and police reports.
A recorded statement to an insurer. A plaintiff’s recorded statement to the defendant’s adjuster is a section 1220 statement the defense can play against the plaintiff. Statements made in negotiating a settlement are a different matter: sections 1152 and 1154 bar them for the purposes those sections cover, whatever section 1220 says. See settlement offers under sections 1152 and 1154.
Social media posts and text messages. A party’s own post or text is a section 1220 statement. The fight is almost always authentication, not hearsay: section 1401 requires authentication before a writing is received, and section 403, subdivision (a)(3) and (4) set the threshold at evidence sufficient to sustain a finding. Authorship can be shown circumstantially, by content and context. In People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1434-1435, a social media page was authenticated by its personal photographs and details and the password requirement for posting, and “[t]he fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding authenticity goes to the document’s weight as evidence, not its admissibility.” A text thread can also carry an adoptive admission: the other driver texts “you were on your phone,” and the reply is “I know, I’m sorry.”
Deposition testimony and discovery responses. A party’s deposition is admissible against that party without any showing of unavailability. Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620, subdivision (b) lets an adverse party use “for any purpose” the deposition of a party, and “[i]t is not ground for objection … that the deponent is available to testify, has testified, or will testify.” Interrogatory answers may be used “only against the responding party” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.410). Both are evidentiary admissions: the party can explain them and the jury weighs them. A matter admitted in response to a request for admission is different. It “is conclusively established against the party making the admission in the pending action” unless the court allows withdrawal or amendment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.410, subd. (a).)
Statements in medical records. A history the plaintiff gave in the emergency room (“fell from ladder at home,” “was not wearing seatbelt”) is a section 1220 statement when the defense offers it against the plaintiff. A defendant driver’s statement recorded in that driver’s own chart is the same against the defendant. Each is two layers of hearsay, and section 1201 admits the evidence only if each layer “meets the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule.” The patient’s words clear the inner layer under section 1220; the chart entry needs its own foundation, usually the business records exception in section 1271. A history the chart does not attribute to the patient (a paramedic’s summary, a family member’s account) does not clear the inner layer on section 1220 alone.
The officer defendant in a civil rights case. What a defendant officer said on body-worn camera, wrote in a use-of-force report, or told investigators is admissible against that officer under section 1220. Whether the same words come in against the city or county is a different question under sections 1222 and 1224, covered in authorized admissions and employee statements. In a multi-defendant trial, a statement admissible against one defendant only calls for a limiting instruction: section 355 requires the court, “upon request,” to “restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” A codefendant with an antagonistic position may itself offer the statement (Flinner). Access to personnel and investigation files is a Pitchess question, separate from admissibility.
No. The statute applies only when the statement is “offered against the declarant.” In People v. Williamson (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 206, 213-214, the defendant offered his own out-of-court statement, arguing it was against his interest. The Court of Appeal held his “reliance on section 1220 of the Evidence Code is misplaced” because “the statement was not ‘offered against the declarant’ as required by the statute,” and exclusion was correct. A plaintiff cannot use section 1220 to put in what the plaintiff told the officer at the scene, and a defendant cannot use it to put in a favourable account given to its own adjuster.
The route that does exist is completeness. Under section 356, “[w]here part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party.” In Carson, once the defense put in the plaintiff’s statement that his wife did not have time to cross, the plaintiff was entitled to ask whether he had also told the officer the defendant’s car “went by him fast.” The trial judge excluded it as self-serving hearsay, and the Supreme Court held that was error: the remainder “will come in if it in any way explains, modifies, qualifies or has relevant reference to the part already introduced,” and “[t]he self-serving nature of the second hearsay statement does not preclude its admission under Evidence Code section 356.” (Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 850-851.) The error was held harmless on that record. (Id. at p. 851.) The lesson for the party offering a statement: the opponent’s answer to an excerpt is the rest of the conversation on the same subject, so decide before trial whether the excerpt is worth it.
Sections 1222 and 1224 deal with statements by someone other than the party, such as an agent or employee. Those rules are set out in authorized admissions and employee statements under sections 1222 to 1224. The other rule lawyers confuse with section 1220 is the declaration against interest in section 1230, which applies to a declarant “having sufficient knowledge of the subject” if “the declarant is unavailable as a witness” and the statement, “when made,” was so far against the declarant’s pecuniary, proprietary, liability or social interest “that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.” Carson is the cautionary example of a trial court reaching for the wrong one.
| Question | Party statement (§ 1220) | Adoptive admission (§ 1221) | Declaration against interest (§ 1230) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who made it | The party | Anyone; the party adopted it | Anyone with sufficient knowledge of the subject |
| Offered by whom | Any party, but only against the declarant | Any party, but only against the adopting party | Any party, for or against anyone |
| Declarant unavailable? | Not required | Not required | Required |
| Against interest when made? | Not required; may be self-serving (Zack) | Not required | Required, to the degree the statute describes |
| Personal knowledge? | Not required (Kincaid) | Party must know the content of the statement adopted | “Sufficient knowledge of the subject” |
| Trustworthiness showing? | None (Carpenter, Gonzalez) | None beyond the adoption foundation | Built into the against-interest test |
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) begins: “A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay.” Subdivision (d)(2) covers a statement “offered against an opposing party” that “(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity; (B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.” The Advisory Committee explained that admissions “are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule,” and that “[n]o guarantee of trustworthiness is required.” The 2011 restyling dropped the word “admissions” from the title because “a statement can be within the exclusion even if it ‘admitted’ nothing and was not against the party’s interest when made.”
| Point | California (§§ 1220, 1221) | Federal (rule 801(d)(2)(A), (B)) |
|---|---|---|
| Label | An exception: “not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule” | An exclusion: “not hearsay” |
| Who may offer it | Only against the declarant or adopting party | Only “against an opposing party” |
| Representative capacity | Either capacity, regardless of the capacity in which the statement was made | “In an individual or representative capacity” |
| Adoption | “With knowledge of the content,” by “words or other conduct” | A statement the party “manifested that it adopted or believed to be true” |
| Against interest, trustworthiness, personal knowledge | None required (Carpenter; Zack; Kincaid) | None required (Advisory Com. Notes) |
| Completeness | Evid. Code § 356 | Fed. Rules Evid., rule 106 |
The label difference rarely changes a ruling. Neither system asks whether a party’s own statement is trustworthy before admitting it against that party, so in either court the objection that the party was wrong, confused or pressured is an argument for the jury, or for section 352 and its federal counterpart, not a hearsay objection.
Yes. Section 1220 removes the hearsay objection and nothing else. “Concluding that defendant’s statement was not excludable under the hearsay rule does not, of course, necessarily mean it was admissible.” (Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1049.) In Gonzalez the Supreme Court found the statement admissible under section 1220 and then separately reviewed, and upheld, the trial court’s finding that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial. (Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 409.) The second gate is where most party-statement fights are won or lost: a remark about insurance, a reference to drinking that the evidence does not connect to the crash, or a statement that drags in another incident. See section 352 motions in limine. Statements made in negotiating a compromise are governed by sections 1152 and 1154 regardless of section 1220 (settlement communications).
“He didn’t know what he was talking about.” The opponent argues the party was guessing, repeating what others told him, or concussed. The best response is Kincaid and Carpenter: section 1220 has no personal knowledge or reliability condition, and the party is in the courtroom to explain. The opponent’s better ground is section 352, framed around what the statement actually proves, not around whether it was reliable.
Silence at the scene. The proponent argues Southers: the party heard the account, was able to speak, and a person in that position would have corrected a version that blamed him. The opponent’s best argument goes to the foundation facts: injury, shock, noise, distance, language, or a pending arrest that supplies another reason for saying nothing. Because the judge only decides whether the evidence supports a reasonable inference, the opponent who loses the admissibility ruling should be ready to make the same points to the jury and to ask for an instruction that the statement may not be considered unless the jury finds adoption.
The excerpt and the rest of the conversation. The proponent plays the damaging minute of a recorded statement; the opponent invokes section 356 and Carson to play the explanation that followed. The proponent’s best answer is that the remainder is on a different subject. The opponent’s best answer is Carson‘s test: anything that “explains, modifies, qualifies or has relevant reference to the part already introduced” comes in, self-serving or not.
A plaintiff’s statements in the medical chart. The defense offers the intake history as a party statement. The plaintiff’s best response is on the outer layer and on attribution: the record has to qualify under section 1271, and the entry has to be shown to be the plaintiff’s own words rather than a summary from someone else. The defense’s best answer is section 1201 and a custodian or treating provider who can say how histories are taken and recorded.
For the rest of the hearsay map, see the California hearsay exceptions guide and the California Evidence Code guide.
David Gammill is a California trial lawyer who served seven years as a Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney and has tried more than 100 cases to verdict. He represents injured people in the South Bay and across Los Angeles County. State Bar of California No. 258286.
Trying a case that turns on what a party said? Gammill Law accepts trial referrals and co-counsel arrangements from other attorneys. See For Attorneys, contact us, or call 310-750-4149.
This page is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Verify all authority independently before relying on it in any filing.