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Evidence Code 1152 and 1154: Are Settlement Offers Admissible in California, and What Mediation Confidentiality Adds

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In a California civil trial, a settlement offer is inadmissible to prove liability (Evidence Code section 1152), and a plaintiff’s offer to take less is inadmissible to prove the claim is invalid (section 1154). Both sections also cover conduct and statements made in negotiating the offer, and both are limited to that purpose: the same evidence can come in to show bias, bad-faith claims handling, or the weakness of a different claim. Mediation is different. Under section 1119, what is said or written for a mediation is inadmissible and undiscoverable in a later civil case for any purpose, and the California Supreme Court has refused to create exceptions.

  • Section 1152 protects the party who offers or pays, in compromise or from humanitarian motives. Barred purpose: that party’s liability.
  • Section 1154 protects the claimant who offers to accept less. Barred purpose: invalidity of the claim.
  • Neither is a privilege. They limit admissibility for one purpose and do not block discovery.
  • Section 1119 bars admission, discovery and compelled disclosure of mediation communications in any noncriminal proceeding. The only exceptions are in the statute.
  • Section 998 offers are kept from the jury, then used by the judge after verdict to decide costs.

What do Evidence Code sections 1152 and 1154 say?

Subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 1152 reads:

“Evidence that a person has, in compromise or from humanitarian motives, furnished or offered or promised to furnish money or any other thing, act, or service to another who has sustained or will sustain or claims that he or she has sustained or will sustain loss or damage, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove his or her liability for the loss or damage or any part of it.”

Section 1154 is the mirror image for the claimant:

“Evidence that a person has accepted or offered or promised to accept a sum of money or any other thing, act, or service in satisfaction of a claim, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to prove the invalidity of the claim or any part of it.”

What do you have to show to keep a settlement communication out?

  1. An offer, payment or promise. Money or “any other thing, act, or service” (section 1152), or an offer to accept something “in satisfaction of a claim” (section 1154).
  2. Made in compromise or from humanitarian motives. A letter itemizing what the sender says is owed and demanding payment “is, in effect, a bill” and not an offer of compromise. (Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1477, citing Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1494.)
  3. Or conduct or statements “made in negotiation thereof.” This reaches factual admissions made at the table. In C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 13, the Supreme Court upheld exclusion of an agent’s admission during settlement talks even though it “might have impeached” a trial witness. Section 1152 changed the earlier rule admitting independent admissions of fact, because that rule prevented “the complete candor between the parties that is most conducive to settlement.”
  4. Offered for the barred purpose. If the proponent names another purpose, the fight moves to relevance, section 352 and a limiting instruction.

No existing dispute is required. Section 1152, unlike Federal Rule 408, “does not require the preexistence of a dispute, and expressly applies to a prospective loss.” (Mangano v. Verity, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 217, 223, a Court of Appeal decision.)

Are settlement offers admissible for another purpose in California?

Yes. Sections 1152 and 1154 “are not absolute bars to admissibility, since a settlement document may be admissible for a purpose other than proving liability.” (Volkswagen, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) The purposes that recur in injury and civil rights trials:

  • Bias of a settling party or witness. In Diamond v. Reshko (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 828, the plaintiffs settled with a cab company whose driver and lawyer stayed in the trial. The Court of Appeal held that section 1152 did not bar the settlement when offered to show bias and realigned interests, that excluding it was an abuse of discretion, and that the error was prejudicial. (Id. at pp. 846-849.)
  • Bad-faith claims handling. Section 1152 “does not preclude the introduction of settlement negotiations if offered not to prove liability for the original loss but to prove failure to process the claim fairly and in good faith.” (White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, 887.)
  • A different claim. In Zhou, the plaintiff’s letters to the insurer for a second, later collision said that collision had worsened his neck and back. The defendants in the first-collision case offered them “to show the invalidity of a different claim.” Excluding them was error, though harmless there. (Zhou, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1479-1482.)
  • Enforcing a judgment. A judgment debtor could not use section 1152 to refuse questions about a collapsed post-judgment settlement. (Young v. Keele (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1093-1094.)

Statements with no connection to a compromise are ordinary party admissions. A defendant’s remark that he would help with the injured person’s medical bills, made outside any negotiation, was not an offer of compromise. (People v. Muniz (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1508, 1515-1516, disapproved on another ground in People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740.) For statements by employees and agents, see authorized admissions under sections 1222 to 1224. The line between “connected” and “independent” statements is drawn “in light of the strong policy in favor of promoting candor during settlement negotiations.” (Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 36.)

Discovery is a separate question. The two sections are “directed at the admissibility of evidence, not its discovery.” (Volkswagen, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.) The same opinion contrasts section 1119, which says mediation evidence is not “admissible or subject to discovery.” A request for the other side’s settlement communications is therefore resisted on relevance, not on section 1152.

What are the statutory exceptions in section 1152?

  • Subdivision (b), insurance bad faith. The Legislature added subdivision (b) in 1987, two years after White (Stats. 1987, ch. 496, § 1). It leaves the White rule in place and regulates it. If an offer to compromise is admitted in an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or violation of Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h), then at the request of either side “evidence relating to any other offer or counteroffer to compromise the same or substantially the same claimed loss or damage shall also be admissible for the same purpose.” One offer in, and the rest of the negotiation can follow.
  • Subdivision (b), post-trial. Outside those actions, “evidence of settlement offers shall not be admitted in a motion for a new trial, in any proceeding involving an additur or remittitur, or on appeal.”
  • Subdivision (c). The section does not affect evidence of partial satisfaction of a claim “without questioning its validity” when offered to prove the claim is valid, or a debtor’s payment or promise offered to prove a new or revived duty.

Do medical payments and advance payments admit fault?

Not under the text of either statute. Section 1152 reaches money, things, acts or services furnished “from humanitarian motives,” not only offers made in compromise, so on its face it covers a defendant or insurer who pays an ambulance bill or a rental car before anyone has discussed settlement. Insurance Code section 11583 adds that no advance or partial payment of damages by a person or liability insurer, made “as an accommodation to an injured person,” “shall be construed as an admission of liability.” Two more parts of section 11583 matter to plaintiffs. The payment is a credit against any later settlement or judgment that does not expressly account for it. And the payer must give written notice of the statute of limitations, including public-entity claim deadlines, when payment begins. Failure to give it tolls the deadline until notice is given. No notice is required if the recipient has a lawyer.

Apologies fall under section 1160. The portion of a statement “expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence” after an accident is inadmissible as an admission of liability, but “a statement of fault … shall not be inadmissible pursuant to this section.” So “I am sorry you were hurt, and we will cover the ambulance” stays out. “I ran the light” stays out only if it was said in negotiating a compromise.

Can a CCP 998 offer be mentioned at trial?

No. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (b)(2), an offer not accepted “shall be deemed withdrawn, and cannot be given in evidence upon the trial or arbitration.” The Supreme Court gives sections 998 and 1152 “a parallel construction”: both bar the offer to prove liability on the claim it proposed to compromise and “permit its introduction to prove some other matter at issue.” (White, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 888-889.) The offer is not evidence at trial. Its use comes after verdict, under the statute itself: if the offeree “fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award,” subdivisions (c) through (e) shift post-offer costs and allow the court to award post-offer expert witness fees, which the court decides by comparing the offer with the result. Drafting and timing are covered in the section 998 guide.

What does Evidence Code section 1119 say about mediation?

Section 1119 reads:

“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter: (a) No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given. (b) No writing, as defined in Section 250, that is prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation, is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given. (c) All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation consultation shall remain confidential.”

There is no purpose limit. The section bars discovery as well as admission, and it covers anything said or written for the mediation, offer or not.

Are there exceptions to mediation confidentiality?

Only the ones in the chapter. Five Supreme Court decisions say so.

  • Foxgate Homeowners’ Assn. v. Bramalea California, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1. “[T]here are no exceptions to the confidentiality of mediation communications or to the statutory limits on the content of mediator’s reports.” (Id. at p. 4.) A mediator may not report bad faith to the court, and a sanctions motion may not rest on mediation communications. A party may still report “noncommunicative conduct, including violation of the orders of a mediator or the court during mediation.” (Id. at p. 18, fn. 14.)
  • Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407. Photographs, witness statements and recorded test analyses prepared for a mediation are protected. There is no “good cause” exception. Physical samples are not writings, and “facts known to percipient witnesses” stay discoverable. (Id. at pp. 416-417, 423-424 & fn. 8.)
  • Fair v. Bakhtiari (2006) 40 Cal.4th 189. A term sheet signed at mediation is admissible under section 1123, subdivision (b) only if it “directly express[es] the parties’ agreement to be bound.” An arbitration clause is not enough.
  • Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570. No estoppel and no implied waiver. An oral settlement reached at mediation could not be proved, and the contract claim failed. (Id. at pp. 586, 588-589.)
  • Cassel v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 113. A client’s private talks with his own lawyers about the mediation were “neither discoverable nor admissible,” even “for purposes of proving a claim of legal malpractice.” (Id. at pp. 137-138.) Judicially crafted exceptions “are permitted only where due process is implicated, or where literal construction would produce absurd results.” (Id. at p. 124.)

The due process reference traces to Rinaker v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 155, where juveniles in a delinquency proceeding sought a mediator’s testimony to impeach their accuser. Foxgate called it “clearly distinguishable.” (Foxgate, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 15.) Foxgate found no comparable due process right in a civil party’s wish to use mediation evidence on a sanctions motion.

The statutory limits a trial lawyer uses:

  • Section 1120, subdivision (a). Evidence “otherwise admissible or subject to discovery outside of a mediation” is not protected “solely by reason of its introduction or use in a mediation.” Records and photographs attached to a mediation brief are still evidence. The brief is not.
  • Section 1122. Express agreement of all participants, in writing or orally under section 1118.
  • Sections 1123 and 1124. Signed written settlements that say they are admissible, enforceable or binding, and oral agreements recorded as section 1118 requires.
  • Section 1117, subdivision (b)(2). The chapter does not apply to a settlement conference under rule 3.1380 of the California Rules of Court. Statements there are governed by sections 1152 and 1154, so they can come in for a purpose other than liability or invalidity.
  • Sections 1125 and 1126. A mediation ends on a signed settlement, a written termination, or 10 calendar days without communication between the mediator and any party about the dispute. What was protected stays protected.
  • Section 1128. “Any reference to a mediation during any subsequent trial is an irregularity in the proceedings of the trial” for purposes of a new trial motion.

Mediation briefs “epitomize” protected writings, and emails sent the day before a mediation that quoted the brief were protected too. But a conversation is not protected merely because a mediation is on calendar. The party claiming protection has the burden, and the court considers “the timing, context, and content of the communication.” (Wimsatt v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 137, 158-160, a Court of Appeal decision.)

What does Evidence Code section 1129 require before a mediation?

Section 1129 was added by Statutes 2018, chapter 350 (Sen. Bill No. 954). Since January 1, 2019, a lawyer must, “as soon as reasonably possible before the client agrees to participate,” give the client a printed disclosure of the section 1119 restrictions and obtain a signed acknowledgment. It must be in the client’s preferred language, in at least 12-point font, on a single page not attached to anything else, and signed and dated by lawyer and client. Subdivision (d) supplies safe-harbor wording, which tells the client that communications with the lawyer in preparation for or during a mediation cannot be used “even if you later decide to sue your attorney for malpractice because of something that happens during the mediation.” That is Cassel put in writing for the client. Class and representative actions are exempt. Noncompliance “is not a basis to set aside an agreement” reached in the mediation, but section 1122, subdivision (a)(3) allows the disclosure to be used in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.

What comes in and what stays out?

ItemAt the injury trialWhere it can be used
Section 998 offer and cover letterOut. CCP § 998(b)(2); §§ 1152, 1154.Post-verdict costs; a later bad-faith action (White).
Plaintiff’s demand offering to settle for a sumOut to prove the claim invalid or worth less. § 1154.A different claim (Zhou).
Letter that only itemizes and demands full paymentNot a compromise offer (Zhou).
Adjuster’s offer and negotiation statementsOut to prove liability. § 1152(a).Bad-faith action; § 1152(b) then opens the other offers.
Medical or advance paymentOut as an admission. § 1152(a); Ins. Code § 11583.Credit against the judgment.
Apology with an offer to pay billsOut. §§ 1160, 1152.
“It was my fault,” outside any negotiationIn. § 1160(a).
Mediation briefOut and not discoverable. § 1119(b); Wimsatt.Only by express agreement. § 1122.
Preexisting records attached to the briefIn if otherwise admissible. § 1120(a).
Signed mediated agreement stating it is bindingIn to enforce it. § 1123(b); Fair.
Settlement with a codefendant who testifiesIn for bias, with a limiting instruction (Diamond).

How does California differ from Federal Rule of Evidence 408?

PointCaliforniaFederal
Barred purposeLiability for the loss (§ 1152); invalidity of the claim (§ 1154).To “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim.”
ImpeachmentNo express text. C & K Engineering upheld exclusion of a negotiation statement offered to impeach.Expressly barred: no use “to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.”
Existing disputeNot required (Mangano).The claim must be “disputed.”
Humanitarian paymentsInside § 1152, with conduct and statements in negotiating them.Rule 409: “medical, hospital, or similar expenses” only, with no clause covering statements.
Other purposesCase law: bias, bad faith, a different claim.Rule 408(b): “a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay,” obstruction.
Mediation§ 1119, statutory exceptions only.Nothing in Rule 408. In a section 1983 case with state claims, “federal privilege law governs,” and the Ninth Circuit left open whether a federal mediation privilege exists. (Wilcox v. Arpaio (9th Cir. 2014) 753 F.3d 872, 876-877.) The court later reversed a ruling that had applied section 1123, subdivision (b) to a mediated settlement of federal and state claims, even though only state claims remained by the time of the ruling. (In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation (9th Cir. 2016) 835 F.3d 1155, 1158-1159.)

Where are the fights at trial, and what is the best argument on each side?

A codefendant’s settlement. The settling parties argue that the jury will read the settlement as an admission, which is the use section 1152 forbids, and that section 352 favors keeping it out. The remaining defendant argues Diamond: the evidence goes to bias and realigned interests, not liability, and a limiting instruction answers the prejudice. When the settling party will testify or stay in the courtroom as a party, Diamond is the stronger position, and a plaintiff who settles with one defendant mid-case should plan the trial on the assumption that the jury will hear about it.

The plaintiff’s demand letter. The defense wants the letter’s description of the injuries, or its number, in front of the jury as a party admission. The plaintiff’s argument is section 1154 and C & K Engineering: the statute covers statements made in negotiating the demand, and the letter is being offered to prove part of the claim invalid. The defense’s best reply is Zhou: the statement is independent of any offer, or it concerns a different claim from the one being tried. The practical lesson for plaintiffs is that a letter drafted as a pure itemized bill gets less protection than one that proposes a compromise.

Negotiation statements offered for a non-liability purpose. The proponent names bias, notice, or bad faith. The opponent’s argument is that the stated purpose is a label, and that the only real inference runs through liability or the weakness of the claim. Mangano shows why the purpose has to be pinned down: an exclusion “for purposes of establishing liability” leaves other uses open. (Mangano, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 223-224.)

Something that surfaced at mediation. Sections 1119 and 1128 keep the mediation itself out of the trial. The real dispute is usually a document or a fact one side first saw there. The party resisting argues it was “prepared for the purpose of” the mediation. The party offering it argues section 1120: it existed apart from the mediation and was only used there. Rojas draws the line between the writing prepared for mediation, which is protected, and the underlying facts and physical evidence, which are not.

Common mistakes

  • Calling section 1152 a privilege. It does not block discovery.
  • Objecting without making the proponent state the purpose. The ruling depends on it.
  • Planning to impeach with a mediation statement. In a civil case section 1119 bars it.
  • Leaving mediation with a term sheet that is unsigned or does not say it is binding. Fair and Simmons are the result.
  • Creating evidence for the mediation. A report or witness statement prepared for it is protected under Rojas, including from your own later use.
  • Treating a settlement conference as a mediation, or assuming section 1119 follows the case into federal court.

More trial rules are in the California Evidence Code guide.

Sources

  1. Cal. Evid. Code § 1152. Offers to compromise and humanitarian payments.
  2. Cal. Evid. Code § 1154. Offers to discount a claim.
  3. Cal. Evid. Code § 1160. Statements of sympathy; statements of fault.
  4. Cal. Evid. Code § 1117. Scope of the mediation chapter.
  5. Cal. Evid. Code § 1119. Mediation confidentiality.
  6. Cal. Evid. Code § 1120, § 1122, § 1123, § 1124, § 1125, § 1126 and § 1128. Limits, exceptions, end of mediation, reference at trial.
  7. Cal. Evid. Code § 1129. Attorney’s mediation disclosure.
  8. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 998. Offers to compromise.
  9. Cal. Ins. Code § 11583. Advance and partial payments.
  10. Fed. Rules Evid., rule 408 and rule 409.
  11. C & K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1.
  12. White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870.
  13. Foxgate Homeowners’ Assn. v. Bramalea California, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1.
  14. Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407.
  15. Fair v. Bakhtiari (2006) 40 Cal.4th 189.
  16. Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570.
  17. Cassel v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 113.
  18. Young v. Keele (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1090.
  19. People v. Muniz (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1508.
  20. Rinaker v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 155.
  21. Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12.
  22. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1481.
  23. Wimsatt v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 137.
  24. Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471.
  25. Mangano v. Verity, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 217.
  26. Diamond v. Reshko (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 828.
  27. Wilcox v. Arpaio (9th Cir. 2014) 753 F.3d 872.
  28. In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation (9th Cir. 2016) 835 F.3d 1155.
  29. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1380 and Advisory Committee Comment. Mandatory settlement conferences.

David Gammill is a California trial lawyer who served seven years as a Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney and has tried more than 100 cases to verdict. He represents injured people in the South Bay and across Los Angeles County. State Bar of California No. 258286.

A settlement or mediation question heading into trial? Gammill Law accepts trial referrals and co-counsel arrangements from other attorneys. See For Attorneys, contact us, or call 310-750-4149.

This page is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Verify all authority independently before relying on it in any filing.

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