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Evidence Code 1280: Official Records, Police Reports and Vehicle Code 20013 in California Civil Trials

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Evidence Code section 1280 takes a public employee’s record out of the hearsay rule when it was made within the scope of duty, at or near the time of the event, from trustworthy sources. No custodian has to testify if the court can judicially notice the duty to record. A traffic collision report can meet that test for what the officer saw and measured, but the report itself usually stays out of a California civil trial: witness statements in it are a second layer of hearsay, the officer’s conclusion on fault is opinion, and Vehicle Code section 20013 bars use of a required accident report as evidence in a trial arising out of the accident.

  • No custodian required: unlike section 1271, judicial notice and the presumption that official duty was regularly performed can supply the foundation.
  • Each layer needs its own exception: section 1280 covers the officer’s entry, not what a driver or bystander said.
  • Contents come in through witnesses: the officer’s observations, party admissions, spontaneous statements and past recollection recorded.
  • Federal court differs: Rule 803(8) admits investigative findings in civil cases.

What does Evidence Code section 1280 say?

Evidence Code section 1280 reads:

“Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in any civil or criminal proceeding to prove the act, condition, or event if all of the following applies: (a) The writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public employee. (b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event. (c) The sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.”

The section answers a hearsay objection and nothing else. Authentication, opinion limits, section 352 and Vehicle Code section 20013 are separate questions.

What are the three foundation elements?

  1. Made by and within the scope of duty of a public employee. “Public employee” means “an officer, agent, or employee of a public entity” (Evid. Code, § 195). An agency’s private agent can qualify (Bhatt v. State Dept. of Health Services (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 923, 929-930 [Medi-Cal fiscal intermediary]).
  2. Made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event. A statutory reporting deadline plus the presumption of regular performance can carry this element (People v. Dunlap (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1478-1479).
  3. Sources of information and method and time of preparation indicate trustworthiness. This element “is established by a showing that the written report is based upon the observations of public employees who have a duty to observe the facts and report and record them correctly” (People v. Baeske (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 775, 780).

All three are required, and the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether they are met (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106). The recording employee need not have personal knowledge: Martinez upheld criminal history printouts built from reports other public employees had a statutory duty to make.

How is section 1280 different from the business records exception?

Section 1271, subdivision (c), requires a custodian or other qualified witness to testify to the record’s identity and mode of preparation. Section 1280 has no such subdivision. Quoting the Law Revision Commission, the Supreme Court said section 1280 “permits the court to admit an official record or report without necessarily requiring a witness to testify as to its identity and mode of preparation if the court takes judicial notice or if sufficient independent evidence shows that the record or report was prepared in such a manner as to assure its trustworthiness” (Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 128-129).

The court can judicially notice the statutes that impose the recording duty. And Evidence Code section 664 presumes “that official duty has been regularly performed,” which shifts the burden on the trustworthiness of the method of preparation to the objecting party (Martinez, at p. 130; Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1477). Under section 1271 the proponent carries that burden (People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953). In police cases, note that section 664 by its terms “does not apply on an issue as to the lawfulness of an arrest” made without a warrant.

The civil example is Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 317-319. The trial court excluded federal inspectors’ poultry condemnation certificates, apparently because the witness who described their preparation was not the custodian. The Court of Appeal reversed: “unlike the business records exception, the official records exception does not require ‘the custodian or other qualified witness’ to testify.” The same opinion shows the limit. One entry on each certificate was filled in by the private plant’s employees, so that entry had to come in under section 1271 instead.

“A business” in section 1271 includes “governmental activity” (Evid. Code, § 1270), so an agency record can be offered under either section. For the custodian affidavit route, see the section 1271 business records page.

Are police reports admissible in court, or are they hearsay?

A police report offered for its truth is hearsay, usually multiple hearsay. Three separate problems keep a collision report out, and solving one does not solve the others: the witness statements inside it, the officer’s opinion, and Vehicle Code section 20013. The first is taken here. The other two each have a section below.

The witness statements are a second layer. Multiple hearsay comes in only if each statement “meets the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule” (Evid. Code, § 1201). Drivers, passengers and bystanders have no official duty to observe or report, so section 1280 does not reach what they told the officer. Baeske excluded a police report of a neighbor’s phone call about a license plate for that reason (58 Cal.App.3d at pp. 780-781). The Supreme Court drew the same line in Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 461-462, a DMV hearing case: the officer’s report fell within section 1280, the driver’s admission in it came in under section 1220, and the other witnesses’ statements fit no exception. Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 114, 126, a civil premises case under the former business records statute, asks the same question: is the content based on the officer’s own observations, or those of other officers or public officials whose job it is to know the facts recorded?

The rule cuts both ways, and a blanket ruling is error. In Jane IL Doe v. Brightstar Residential Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 171, 178-180, the trial court excluded a police file on summary judgment with the comment that “police reports are usually never admissible.” The Court of Appeal reversed. “Double hearsay is admissible if a justification for admitting the evidence rebuts the hearsay objection at each level.” The owner’s statement to the officer was a party admission under section 1220 and an authorized admission against his company under section 1222. Employees’ statements were offered for notice, not truth. At the second level, the officer’s report was an official record under section 1280. Two cautions: the defendants there did not contest the section 1280 foundation, and the case did not involve a collision report or section 20013.

Can the officer’s opinion on fault come in?

Two arguments keep the officer’s fault conclusion away from the jury. Neither is a holding in these words, so each is set out with what it rests on.

First, a fault conclusion is not a record of an act, condition or event. Section 1280 lifts the hearsay bar only for a writing “made as a record of an act, condition, or event.” For the same words in section 1271, the Supreme Court has applied the rule that “a conclusion is neither an act, condition or event,” while a finding that records what the writer saw, such as a broken femur or a bullet wound to the heart, does qualify (People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 980-981). The argument is that an officer’s entry naming the party at fault is reasoning from statements, marks and damage, not an observation. The closest authority is Carlton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1428, 1432, a DMV hearing case applying the civil standard for evidence admissible over objection. It held that a police accident report, “irrespective of Vehicle Code section 20013, would not be admissible under the business records or official records exceptions,” and that the officer’s opinion that the driver was “most responsible” was “a legal conclusion and not a proper subject for expert opinion.” The answer from the other side is that Beeler let a cause of death in, so what the officer physically found at the scene is observation and only the fault label is conclusion.

Second, an officer who did not see the crash has no lay opinion on fault to give. Lay opinion is limited to an opinion “[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness” and “[h]elpful to a clear understanding of his testimony” (Evid. Code, § 800). The objection is that an officer who arrived afterward perceived the aftermath, not the collision, so a view on how it happened must qualify as expert opinion under section 801. On that footing the Supreme Court has allowed a qualified traffic officer who did not see the accident to give an opinion on point of impact where the answer is not obvious to an untrained person (Kastner v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1965) 63 Cal.2d 52, 57-58). Kastner sets the limits in the same opinion: “Opinion evidence based on hearsay is inadmissible,” and the court distinguished cases where the officer’s opinion rested on what drivers and witnesses told him (id. at pp. 58-59). Today an expert may not relate case-specific hearsay as true unless it is independently proven or covered by an exception (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686). And under Carlton, even a qualified officer may not say who was most responsible. See hearsay in expert testimony and the Sanchez checklist.

What does Vehicle Code section 20013 say, and which reports does it cover?

Vehicle Code section 20013 reads:

“No such accident report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the department shall furnish upon demand of any person who has, or claims to have, made such a report or upon demand of any court, a certificate showing that a specified accident report has or has not been made to the department solely to prove a compliance or failure to comply with the requirement that such a report be made to the department.”

“Such accident report” points back to two neighboring sections:

  • Section 20008 creates the required report. A driver involved in an accident causing injury or death must make a written report within 24 hours to the California Highway Patrol or, inside a city, to the CHP or city police. Common carrier owners or drivers report to the CHP by the 10th day of the following month.
  • Section 20012 is the access statute. Required reports are “without prejudice to the individual so reporting” and confidential to the DMV and CHP, but the agency must disclose the entire contents to anyone with a proper interest, including drivers, injured persons, persons who may incur civil liability, and their attorneys.

Obtaining the report under section 20012 says nothing about admitting it.

Does section 20013 bar the investigating officer’s own report?

This is not settled. No published appellate decision squarely decides whether section 20013, as distinct from the hearsay rule, bars an investigating officer’s own report in a civil trial.

The text and three decisions point to drivers’ reports only. Section 20013 bars “such accident report.” The section before it speaks of “required accident reports,” and the report the Vehicle Code requires is the driver’s under section 20008. In a discovery ruling, the Supreme Court quoted section 20013 as “[n]o [required] accident report shall be used as evidence” and said that “only required reports, not police reports, are confidential” (State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 847, 857). People v. Ansbro (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 273, 277, says “it is the required reports which are covered by the confidential privileges in sections 20012 and 20013” and that “[r]eports of accidents made by investigating officers are not so privileged.” Collins v. Navistar, Inc. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1515-1516, a product liability appeal, reads “such accident report” as the report section 20008 requires of drivers. That passage was not necessary to the result, which was that section 20013 does not bar statistics drawn from federal crash databases.

Two decisions apply the section to an officer’s report. Box v. California Date Growers Assn. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 266, 270-271, affirmed exclusion of a CHP officer’s traffic accident report and its diagram, stating that “it is well established that traffic accident reports are not admissible in evidence” and citing section 20013. Sherrell v. Kelso (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d Supp. 22, a superior court appellate division opinion, applied section 20013 to a city police officer’s report and held that the section “excludes the report itself,” not its contents (id. at p. Supp. 28). Box assumed that every traffic accident report is covered and did not discuss the difference between a driver’s report and an officer’s.

A third path avoids the question. Carlton excluded a police accident report as hearsay “irrespective of Vehicle Code section 20013” (203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1432).

The party keeping the report out should object on both grounds, section 20013 and hearsay, so the ruling survives whichever way the statute is read. The party offering it relies on Collins, Ansbro and the Supreme Court’s reading of the statute, and then still needs a hearsay exception for every layer.

What parts of a police report can come in, and how?

  • The officer’s own observations and measurements. Call the officer. Skid marks, rest positions and debris are percipient testimony.
  • Refreshing recollection. The officer may use the report to refresh memory (Robinson v. Cable (1961) 55 Cal.2d 425, 429). Under Box, Evidence Code section 771 does not make the report itself admissible.
  • Past recollection recorded. If the officer cannot recall, section 1237 lets the entry be read to the jury on its statutory foundation. “The writing may be read into evidence, but the writing itself may not be received in evidence unless offered by an adverse party.” Sherrell approved this use of a collision report. Section 1237 cures the officer’s memory, not a bystander’s hearsay.
  • Diagrams. The officers’ scene diagram may be used “solely to illustrate” their testimony (Robinson, at p. 429). Box affirmed exclusion of the report’s diagram on its facts (57 Cal.App.3d at p. 271).
  • Party admissions. A driver’s statement to the officer comes in against that driver under section 1220, an adopted statement under section 1221, an authorized statement under section 1222. See authorized admissions and employee statements.
  • Prior inconsistent statements. When a witness testifies one way and told the officer another, the earlier statement comes in under section 1235. Sherrell upheld the officer’s testimony that a passenger had said she did not know who ran the red light, after she testified that the defendant did.
  • Spontaneous statements. An excited account at the scene can qualify under section 1240. See spontaneous statements.
  • Notice. Prior-incident police reports are relevant to what a defendant knew, but the Supreme Court still required the record foundation (Taylor, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 126; see Brightstar, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 180). A “not for the truth” label fails when the report matters only if the caller was accurate (Baeske, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at pp. 779-780; Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190).

Which other official records come up in injury and police cases?

RecordWhat section 1280 can carryWhat needs another route
911 and CAD dispatch logsThat calls came in and when. In Alvarez, testimony that employees had to record calls accurately laid that foundation (100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1205).The caller’s account. Callers “were not under a duty to accurately report information.” Try section 1240.
Coroner and autopsy reportsObserved findings. Beeler upheld an autopsy report under section 1271, including a cause of death based on direct observation, and said section 1280 requires the same trustworthiness showing (9 Cal.4th at pp. 980-981).Conclusions reasoned from many factors; history from family or police.
DMV and Department of Justice computer recordsEntries made under statutory reporting duties, on judicial notice and section 664 (Martinez; Dunlap).An officer’s fault code in a DMV printout is “triple hearsay” (Carlton, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1434). The accident report a driver files with the DMV may not be referred to at a damages trial (Veh. Code, § 40833).

Peace officer personnel records are a separate problem. See Pitchess motions.

How do certified copies and authentication work?

Authentication and hearsay are separate steps. A purported copy of a writing in the custody of a public entity is “prima facie evidence of the existence and content of such writing” if it is “attested or certified as a correct copy” by a public employee “having the legal custody of the writing” (Evid. Code, § 1530, subd. (a)(2)). The certificate must say in substance that the copy is correct (§ 1531). Official seals and signatures are presumed genuine (§§ 1452, 1453). Section 1532 is narrower: it covers the official record of a writing that a statute authorized to be recorded in that office, not agency reports generally.

Certification proves the copy. The section 1280 foundation is still needed, and judicial notice of the duty to record plus section 664 can supply it without a witness (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1477-1481). Neither step does anything for a second layer of hearsay inside the record.

Section 1271, section 1280 and Vehicle Code 20013 compared

IssueEvid. Code § 1271Evid. Code § 1280Veh. Code § 20013
What it isHearsay exceptionHearsay exceptionStatutory bar
Whose recordAny “business,” including governmental activity (§ 1270)A public employee acting within the scope of dutyThe driver’s required report; unsettled for the officer’s report
Foundation witnessCustodian or other qualified witness, or the affidavit procedureNot required if judicial notice or independent evidence shows trustworthinessNo foundation lifts the bar
Trustworthiness burdenProponentSection 664 can shift it to the objectorNot an element
OpinionsObserved conditions, not reasoned conclusionsSame; fault conclusions excludedBars the report whatever it contains

How does California differ from Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)?

Rule 803(8) admits a public office’s record of its activities, of “a matter observed while under a legal duty to report,” or, “in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation,” unless the opponent shows a lack of trustworthiness. Three points matter:

  • Investigative conclusions. Under Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey (1988) 488 U.S. 153, 169-170, portions of an investigative report “are not inadmissible merely because they state a conclusion or opinion” if based on a factual investigation and trustworthy. Section 1280 has no “factual findings” clause.
  • Burden. The federal rule puts untrustworthiness on the opponent in its text. California gets there only through section 664.
  • Layers. Both systems require an exception for each level (Fed. Rules Evid., rule 805; Evid. Code, § 1201).

Rule 803(8) has no counterpart to Vehicle Code section 20013.

Where are the fights, and what is the best argument on each side?

  • The report as an exhibit. Against: section 20013 as applied in Box and Sherrell, hearsay under Carlton, the unexcepted layers under section 1201, and the weight a jury gives anything that looks official. For: Collins and Ansbro on the statute, section 1280 for the officer’s own layer, and Brightstar for the rule that a blanket exclusion is error. The proponent’s position is strongest when the offer is narrowed to the lines that have an exception at every level.
  • The officer’s opinion. Against: no perception to support lay opinion, hearsay basis under Kastner and Sanchez, and Carlton on fault as a legal conclusion. For: Kastner itself, limited to a physical question such as point of impact, from a qualified officer, on facts that are in evidence through other witnesses.
  • The citation. A violation has to be proven with evidence, not with the officer’s charge. See negligence per se under section 669.
  • Dispatch and prior-incident records. For: section 1280 for the fact and timing of calls, notice as a nonhearsay purpose, section 1240 or section 1222 for the caller’s words. Against: Alvarez, where the logs were relevant only if the callers were accurate, no exception was shown for them, and the authorized-admission theory was never developed.

Common mistakes

  • Treating a certified copy as the answer to a hearsay objection.
  • Skipping the request for judicial notice and leaving section 1280 with no foundation.
  • Offering the whole report when only the defendant’s admission is needed.
  • Arguing “not for the truth” when the report is relevant only if true.
  • Calling the report “official” before the jury, which the Supreme Court called “highly improper” (Robinson, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 429).

Related: California hearsay exceptions and the California Evidence Code series.

Sources

  1. Evid. Code, § 1280. Record by public employee.
  2. Evid. Code, § 1270 and § 1271. “A business” defined; business records.
  3. Evid. Code, § 195. “Public employee.”
  4. Evid. Code, § 664. Official duty presumed regularly performed.
  5. Evid. Code, § 771. Writing used to refresh memory.
  6. Evid. Code, § 800 and § 801. Lay and expert opinion.
  7. Evid. Code, § 1201. Multiple hearsay.
  8. Evid. Code, § 1220, § 1221 and § 1222. Party, adoptive and authorized admissions.
  9. Evid. Code, § 1235. Prior inconsistent statement.
  10. Evid. Code, § 1237. Past recollection recorded.
  11. Evid. Code, § 1240. Spontaneous statement.
  12. Evid. Code, § 1340. Published compilations.
  13. Evid. Code, § 1452 and § 1453. Official seals and signatures presumed genuine.
  14. Evid. Code, § 1530, § 1531 and § 1532. Certified copies of public writings; official record of a recorded writing.
  15. Veh. Code, § 20008, § 20012 and § 20013. Required accident reports; confidentiality and disclosure; use as evidence.
  16. Veh. Code, § 40833. Accident reports to the DMV under section 16000 et seq. not evidence of negligence or due care.
  17. Fed. Rules Evid., rule 803(8) and rule 805. Public records; hearsay within hearsay.
  18. People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106.
  19. Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448.
  20. People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665.
  21. People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953.
  22. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 847.
  23. Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 114.
  24. Kastner v. Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (1965) 63 Cal.2d 52.
  25. Robinson v. Cable (1961) 55 Cal.2d 425.
  26. Jane IL Doe v. Brightstar Residential Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 171.
  27. Collins v. Navistar, Inc. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1486.
  28. Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301.
  29. Bhatt v. State Dept. of Health Services (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 923.
  30. Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190.
  31. People v. Dunlap (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1468.
  32. Carlton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1428.
  33. People v. Ansbro (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 273.
  34. Sherrell v. Kelso (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d Supp. 22 (appellate division of the superior court).
  35. People v. Baeske (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 775.
  36. Box v. California Date Growers Assn. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 266.
  37. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey (1988) 488 U.S. 153.

David Gammill is a California trial lawyer who served seven years as a Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney and has tried more than 100 cases to verdict. He represents injured people in the South Bay and across Los Angeles County. State Bar of California No. 258286.

A case that turns on a police report or an agency record? Gammill Law accepts trial referrals and co-counsel arrangements from other attorneys. See For Attorneys, contact us, or call 310-750-4149.

This page is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Verify all authority independently before relying on it in any filing.

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