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Under California Penal Code section 835a, a police officer may use deadly force only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that it is necessary to stop an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, or to catch a fleeing person whose felony threatened or caused death or serious injury and who will hurt someone else unless caught right away. That “necessary” standard came from Assembly Bill 392 and has applied since January 1, 2020. Before then, the section spoke only of “reasonable force.” It matters to a family because California’s civil jury instructions on deadly force are built from its words.
The operative rule is subdivision (c). Here it is in full, as it reads today:
(c) (1) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), a peace officer is justified in using deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that such force is necessary for either of the following reasons:
(A) To defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person.
(B) To apprehend a fleeing person for any felony that threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury, if the officer reasonably believes that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended. Where feasible, a peace officer shall, prior to the use of force, make reasonable efforts to identify themselves as a peace officer and to warn that deadly force may be used, unless the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe the person is aware of those facts.
(2) A peace officer shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that person poses to themselves, if an objectively reasonable officer would believe the person does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or to another person.
Three words carry the weight: “necessary,” “imminent” and “totality.” Subdivision (a)(2) states the Legislature’s intent “that peace officers use deadly force only when necessary in defense of human life,” and that officers “shall use other available resources and techniques if reasonably safe and feasible to an objectively reasonable officer.”
Force short of deadly force is judged differently. Subdivision (b) allows “objectively reasonable force to effect the arrest, to prevent escape, or to overcome resistance.” A takedown is judged by reasonableness; a shooting is judged by necessity.
Only in the situations the statute lists. Everything else is outside it.
| Situation | What the statute requires | Where it is |
|---|---|---|
| Imminent threat to the officer | The officer reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to defend against an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer. | § 835a(c)(1)(A) |
| Imminent threat to someone else | The same test, where the threat is to “another person,” such as a bystander, a family member or another officer. | § 835a(c)(1)(A) |
| Fleeing felony suspect | All of these: the felony threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury; the officer reasonably believes the person will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless immediately apprehended; and, where feasible, the officer identified as police and warned that deadly force may be used. | § 835a(c)(1)(B) |
| Danger only to the person themselves | Not allowed, if an objectively reasonable officer would believe the person poses no imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or anyone else. | § 835a(c)(2) |
The flight row is narrow. Running is not enough, and neither is running after just any felony. The felony must have threatened or caused death or serious injury, and the officer must believe the person will seriously hurt someone else if not caught right then.
Subdivision (e) defines all three.
(1) “Deadly force” means any use of force that creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury, including, but not limited to, the discharge of a firearm.
(2) A threat of death or serious bodily injury is “imminent” when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or another person. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that, from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed.
(3) “Totality of the circumstances” means all facts known to the peace officer at the time, including the conduct of the officer and the subject leading up to the use of deadly force.
Deadly force is not only gunfire. Any force that creates a substantial risk of death or serious injury qualifies.
Imminent has three parts: present ability, opportunity and apparent intent to cause death or serious injury immediately. A person can have the ability and even the intent without the opportunity. The statute’s second sentence is the one families should read twice: a fear of future harm is not enough, “no matter how great the fear.”
The totality includes the officer’s own conduct. The definition reaches back to what happened “leading up to the use of deadly force,” and it names the conduct of the officer as well as the person shot. If officers rushed a door or gave up time and distance that were available, that is part of the picture. So is what the person did.
The definition also has a limit that the defense will use. It counts “facts known to the peace officer at the time.” Something nobody at the scene knew, such as a fact learned in the autopsy or a later search, does not make the officer’s belief more or less reasonable under this definition.
No. Subdivision (c)(2) says an officer “shall not use deadly force against a person based on the danger that person poses to themselves, if an objectively reasonable officer would believe the person does not pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or to another person.”
Some police shootings begin as a welfare check on someone in crisis. Subdivision (a)(5) records the Legislature’s finding that people with disabilities “are significantly more likely to experience greater levels of physical force during police interactions, as their disability may affect their ability to understand or comply with commands from peace officers.”
The rule turns on whom the person threatened. If someone in crisis turns toward an officer or a relative with a weapon, the defense will argue the threat changed. The fight is then over those seconds, and over whether the officers’ approach caused the change.
Assembly Bill 392 (Stats. 2019, ch. 170) amended Penal Code sections 196 and 835a, effective January 1, 2020. Before it, section 835a said an officer with reasonable cause to arrest “may use reasonable force to effect the arrest, to prevent escape or to overcome resistance,” and need not retreat. It had no separate rule for deadly force.
| Question | Before 2020 | Since January 1, 2020 |
|---|---|---|
| Standard for deadly force | No separate standard; “reasonable force” | Only when “necessary” for the reasons in subdivision (c) |
| Imminence defined | No | Present ability, opportunity and apparent intent to cause harm immediately |
| Conduct leading up to the shooting | Not mentioned | Part of the “totality of the circumstances,” including the officer’s conduct |
| Alternatives to deadly force | Not mentioned | Officers “shall use” them “if reasonably safe and feasible” |
| Danger only to self | Not mentioned | Not a basis for deadly force |
| Retreat | Officer need not retreat | Same, but tactical repositioning and de-escalation are not “retreat” |
AB 392 also rewrote Penal Code section 196: a homicide by a peace officer is justifiable “when the homicide results from a peace officer’s use of force that is in compliance with Section 835a.” So the criminal question whether an officer’s killing was justified now runs through section 835a.
A 2025 bill (Stats. 2025, ch. 241, SB 857) amended the section again effective January 1, 2026. The text is the same in substance; the visible change is the spelling “de-escalation” in subdivision (d).
Yes, in two ways.
The civil jury instructions use it. California’s official instructions for negligence (CACI No. 441) and battery (CACI No. 1305B) claims over deadly force open with the statute’s rule: “A peace officer may use deadly force only when necessary in defense of human life.” The plaintiff must prove the force “was not necessary to defend human life.” The instructions repeat the statute’s definitions and the rule on danger to self, and tell the jury it “must consider” the officer’s “tactical conduct and decisions before using deadly force” and whether the officer used other available alternatives “if it was reasonably safe and feasible.” The Judicial Council’s notes say section 835a “creates a separate, higher standard” for deadly force.
California negligence law already looked at the whole encounter. In Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013), deputies on a welfare check shot a man who walked toward them holding a large knife. The California Supreme Court held that “tactical conduct and decisions preceding the use of deadly force are relevant considerations under California law in determining whether the use of deadly force gives rise to negligence liability.” Officers “have a duty to act reasonably when using deadly force,” and public entities are generally liable for their employees’ negligence on the job.
Hayes also set limits. Officers need not choose “the ‘most reasonable’ action,” as long as what they did was within the range of reasonable conduct, and no particular protocol, such as calling a psychiatric team first, is always required. Where the only injury is the death itself, the earlier tactics are judged as part of the shooting, not as a separate claim.
Courts still end cases for officers when the facts at the end are bad enough. In Villalobos v. City of Santa Maria (2022), officers waited about 40 minutes during a standoff with a man in crisis, used less-lethal rounds, and the man charged them with a knife. The Court of Appeal applied Hayes and upheld summary judgment for the officers. Expect that argument: whatever came before, the last seconds left no choice.
A family can usually bring federal claims alongside state ones, under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, for the deprivation of rights “secured by the Constitution and laws.” For police force, the right is the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures.
The federal test comes from Graham v. Connor (1989). Force is judged by “objective reasonableness,” considering “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” It is judged “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” with allowance for “split-second judgments.” The officer’s motives do not matter either way.
The federal claim is decided under that test, not under section 835a. In 2013, Hayes described state negligence law as broader than federal law, which then tended “to focus more narrowly on the moment when deadly force is used.” In Barnes v. Felix (2025), the United States Supreme Court rejected that “moment-of-threat” approach: “a court must consider all the relevant circumstances, including facts and events leading up to the climactic moment.” It left open whether an officer’s own creation of the danger counts against the officer.
California also has the Bane Act (Civil Code section 52.1), which allows a suit when someone interferes “by threat, intimidation, or coercion” with rights under federal or state law. Bane Act, negligence and battery claims are state-law claims, and that matters for the deadline.
For state-law claims against a city, county or other public entity, six months. Government Code section 911.2 requires a claim “relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person” to be presented “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” The claim is a written form filed with the agency, not a lawsuit. Section 911.4 allows an application to file late, but only within “a reasonable time not to exceed one year” and with a reason for the delay. Do not plan on it.
No lawsuit for damages can be filed against the public entity until the claim has been presented and rejected or deemed rejected (Government Code section 945.4). Once the agency rejects the claim in writing, the lawsuit must be filed within six months of the date the notice was delivered or mailed (Government Code section 945.6).
Federal claims work differently. In Felder v. Casey (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that a state notice-of-claim rule cannot be applied to defeat a section 1983 action, which borrows the state’s personal injury limitations period: two years in California under Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. A family that waits on the federal deadline can lose the state claims, and the state claims carry the 835a standard.
California recognizes two kinds of claims after a death, and they belong to different people.
When the person survived the shooting, the claim is theirs, for their injuries, lost earnings and the rest. List every person who may have a claim, and the estate, in the government claim.
California treats video of a police shooting as a public record with a short delay. Government Code section 7923.625 covers recordings of a “critical incident,” which it defines as an incident “involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer,” or one in which an officer’s use of force “resulted in death or in great bodily injury.”
Make the request in writing, to the agency whose officers were involved, as soon as possible. The 45-day period runs from the incident, not from the request.
Much of it, yes. Penal Code section 832.7 makes officer personnel records confidential in general, but since SB 1421 (Stats. 2018, ch. 988) and later amendments, subdivision (b) makes records about certain incidents public. They include any record “relating to the report, investigation, or findings” of an incident “involving the discharge of a firearm at a person” by an officer, or a use of force “that resulted in death or in great bodily injury.” Sustained findings of excessive force, failure to intervene, dishonesty, sexual assault, and prejudice are also covered.
The release is broad: “all investigative reports; photographic, audio, and video evidence; transcripts or recordings of interviews; autopsy reports,” the materials given to the district attorney on charges, and findings and discipline records. Records are due “no later than 45 days from the date of a request.” During an active criminal investigation they can be delayed up to 60 days from the incident or until the district attorney decides on charges, whichever is sooner, and in some cases longer.
Records that are not public, such as complaints that did not lead to sustained findings, can be sought in a lawsuit through a Pitchess motion. Section 832.7(a) itself points to that route: personnel records may be disclosed in a civil case “by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code.”
When an unarmed person is killed, yes. Government Code section 12525.3 says a state prosecutor, the Attorney General unless another is named, “shall investigate incidents of an officer-involved shooting resulting in the death of an unarmed civilian.” “Unarmed civilian” includes “anyone who is not in possession of a deadly weapon,” and the state prosecutor may also investigate where “there is a reasonable dispute as to whether the civilian was armed.”
The state prosecutor must write a report with the facts, a conclusion on each issue and any policy recommendations, post it on a public website, and bring charges if warranted. The statute does not reach nonfatal shootings or deaths caused by other kinds of force.
Nothing in the statute sets a date for the report, and the six-month claim deadline does not wait for it. To see how often shootings occur where you live, see police shootings in California by county.
If an officer shot or seriously injured someone in your family, the deadlines are short and the first steps matter. See our pages on police shooting cases in Los Angeles and police shooting cases in San Bernardino County, or get a free case evaluation or call 310-750-4149. There are no upfront legal fees; a fee is collected only if we win, under a written contingency fee agreement that complies with California law.
This article is general information, not legal advice for any specific situation, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Laws change and every case turns on its own facts.