Menu
Call
Contact
Blog

Evidence Code Sections 1222 and 1224: When Is an Employee’s Statement Admissible Against the Employer?

By David Gammill, Attorney

Legally reviewed: October 26, 2026 | Updated: October 26, 2026. Cases are cited to the official reports with pin cites.

Part of the California Evidence Code Practitioner Series. See also the California Hearsay Exceptions: Practitioner’s Guide.

Short answer

California has no scope-of-employment admission rule like Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 801(d)(2)(D). An employee’s out-of-court statement is not admissible against the employer just because the employee made it while on the job. Evidence Code section 1222 admits it only if the employer authorized the employee to speak on the subject. That authority can be express or implied (O’Mary v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 563, 570 (O’Mary)). Section 1224 does not make a driver’s statement admissible against an employer merely because the employer is vicariously liable (Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951, 959–960 (Markley)). The other routes are section 1240 (spontaneous statement), section 1230 (declaration against interest, declarant unavailable), section 1220 (driver is a co-defendant, with a section 355 limiting instruction), section 1221 (adoption), and the driver’s deposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620.

What do Evidence Code sections 1222 and 1224 say?

Section 1222 (authorized admissions), verbatim from leginfo:

“Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: (a) The statement was made by a person authorized by the party to make a statement or statements for him concerning the subject matter of the statement; and (b) The evidence is offered either after admission of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of such authority or, in the court’s discretion as to the order of proof, subject to the admission of such evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 1222.)

Section 1224 (declarant whose liability or breach of duty is in issue), verbatim as published on leginfo:

“When the liability obligation, or duty of a party to a civil action is based in whole or in part upon the liability, obligation, or duty of the declarant, or when the claim or right asserted by a party to a civil action is barred or diminished by a breach of duty by the declarant, evidence of a statement made by the declarant is as admissible against the party as it would be if offered against the declarant in an action involving that liability, obligation, duty, or breach of duty.” (Evid. Code, § 1224.)

Both sections were enacted in 1965 (Stats. 1965, ch. 299) and have not been amended. Section 1224 applies only in a “civil action.”

What are the elements of an authorized admission under section 1222?

  1. Offered against a party. The statement is offered against the party (here, the employer) for whom the declarant spoke.
  2. Authority to speak on the subject. The declarant was authorized “to make a statement or statements for him concerning the subject matter of the statement” (Evid. Code, § 1222, subd. (a)). Authority to drive, deliver or manage does not by itself establish authority to speak.
  3. Foundation, or conditional admission. Evidence “sufficient to sustain a finding of such authority” comes in first. Alternatively, in its discretion as to order of proof, the court may admit the statement subject to that evidence (Evid. Code, § 1222, subd. (b)). If the connecting evidence never arrives, ask for a ruling and instruction (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (c)).

How do California courts decide whether an employee was authorized to speak?

Courts look at the employee’s usual authority, how the statement relates to that authority, and the statement’s purpose. The determination “requires an examination of the nature of the employee’s usual and customary authority, the nature of the statement in relation to that authority, and the particular relevance or purpose of the statement” (O’Mary, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 570).

The older cases track the “hierarchy” idea. A mine superintendent had “no more power to bind his employer … by admissions as to the cause of the accident” than the lever operator (Luman v. Golden Ancient Channel Mining Co. (1903) 140 Cal. 700, 709). By contrast, a bathhouse’s “manager over all managers” admitted two weeks after a fall that he “certainly did” find the floor very slippery, and the statement was admitted against the corporation (Johnson v. Bimini Hot Springs (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 892, 895, 902–903). An intern was not high enough in the “hospital’s hierarchy” to be “its spokesman to make admissions” (Crawford v. County of Sacramento (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 791, 801 (Crawford)). And a store manager’s statement that a practice was “company policy” qualified (W. T. Grant Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 284, 286).

Prove authority with evidence beyond the statement itself. Section 1222 requires evidence “sufficient to sustain a finding” of authority (Evid. Code, § 1222, subd. (b)). Unlike Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 801(d)(2), it does not say the statement itself may be considered. Under California agency law, “[t]he declarations of an agent are not admissible to prove the fact of his agency or the extent of his power as such agent” (Howell v. Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 391, 401). Dart Industries is not to the contrary. It upheld admission because the record supported authority, and it distinguished statements an agent makes “of his own authority,” meaning on his own initiative rather than in the course of an authorized act (Dart Industries, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 1077–1078).

Does section 1224 make a driver’s statement admissible against the employer?

Generally, no. The Supreme Court held that “the terms ‘obligation or duty’ in former section 1851 and ‘liability, obligation, or duty’ in Evidence Code sections 1224 and 1302 do not include tort liabilities of employees that are imputed to their employers under the doctrine of respondeat superior” (Markley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 960).

The Court explained that “hearsay statements of an agent or employee not otherwise admissible against the principal or employer are not made admissible merely because they may tend to prove negligence of the agent or employee that may be imputed to the principal or employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior” (Markley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 959). It read the provision as aimed at privity-type relationships, such as guarantors and sureties (id. at pp. 959–960). It also noted that such statements may still come in if they “qualify as spontaneous declarations, were made within the scope of the employment, or are so damaging as to be admissible as declarations against interest” (id. at p. 960). The Court treated a “vicarious admission within the scope of his employment” as a section 1222 question (id. at p. 957).

The narrow exception: Labis. A painter told an investigating officer, about three hours after a fall and while still on the job, that he had moved a drop cloth “but he didn’t realize anybody was standing on it at the time.” The court admitted the statement against the employer under section 1224. It distinguished Markley on its facts and declined to “broaden its language beyond its holding” (Labis v. Stopper (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1004–1005 (Labis)). Labis is a narrow, fact-bound application, not a general employee-statement rule.

FactorMarkley (1967)Labis (1970)
CourtCalifornia Supreme CourtCourt of Appeal, First District, Division Three
TimingAlmost a year later, after the employment endedAbout three hours later, still employed and on the job
ListenerPlaintiff’s investigatorPolice officer investigating the fall
ContentGeneralA specific, detailed act, not a bare “it was my fault”
ResultNot admissible against the employerAdmissible against the employer under § 1224

Section 1224’s second clause. The statute also reaches a party whose own “claim or right … is barred or diminished by a breach of duty by the declarant.” In that situation, the declarant’s statement is admissible against the party as it would be against the declarant. Markley construed the first clause (“liability, obligation, or duty”). Whether its reasoning also limits this clause is an open question.

Practice point: Lay a section 1222, 1240 or 1230 foundation. Treat section 1224 as a fallback, limited to Labis-type facts or true derivative-liability relationships.

How does California differ from FRE 801(d)(2)(C) and (D)?

The federal rule admits statements by any employee on a matter within the scope of employment. California admits only statements the employer authorized. Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 801(d)(2)(D) covers a statement “made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed” (Fed. Rules Evid., rule 801(d)(2)(D), 28 U.S.C.). California considered and rejected that approach. The Law Revision Commission had recommended a rule admitting agents’ statements on matters within the scope of the agency. The recommendation “was withdrawn,” and “California’s ‘hierarchy rule’ remains unless and until it is changed by statutory or case law” (Crawford, supra, 239 Cal.App.2d at p. 800).

IssueCalifornia Evidence CodeFederal Rules of Evidence
Authorized spokesperson§ 1222: authorized to make statements “for” the party on the subjectRule 801(d)(2)(C): “a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subject”
Employee speaking within scope of jobNo general provision; must fit § 1222 or another exceptionRule 801(d)(2)(D): admissible if within the scope of the relationship and while it existed
Statement as proof of its own authorityNo counterpart sentence; agent’s declarations do not prove authority (Courtesy Chevrolet, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 401)“Must be considered but does not by itself establish” authority or the relationship
Derivative liability§ 1224 (civil actions only); not respondeat superior (Markley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 960)2024 amendment: party whose claim, defense or liability is “directly derived from” the declarant or principal
Coconspirators§ 1223Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
LabelHearsay exceptionNot hearsay (exclusion)

The 2024 federal amendment. Effective December 1, 2024, rule 801(d)(2) adds: “If a party’s claim, defense, or potential liability is directly derived from a declarant or the declarant’s principal, a statement that would be admissible against the declarant or the principal under this rule is also admissible against the party.” The committee note’s examples are successors in interest, such as an estate, assignee or trustee. That resembles Markley‘s privity reading of section 1224 more than respondeat superior.

What foundation questions establish authority under section 1222?

Build authority from the employer’s own witnesses and documents: the person most qualified, a manager, job descriptions and written policies.

  1. What was [declarant]’s position on the date of the statement? To whom did [declarant] report?
  2. Was [declarant] responsible for responding to customer incidents, accidents or complaints?
  3. Was [declarant] authorized to speak with customers, the public, police or insurers about incidents?
  4. Is there a written policy, job description or training material on who speaks for the company after an incident? (Request it in discovery.)
  5. Did [declarant] make the statement during work hours, at the workplace, while handling the incident?
  6. Did the company later act on, repeat or adopt the statement? (This also supports section 1221.)

If you rely on Labis-type facts under section 1224: Who employed the declarant? Was the declarant on the job both when the event happened and when the statement was made? Who heard the statement, and when? What exactly was said? Then lay the foundation you would need if the statement were offered against the declarant personally.

What objections and responses come up?

An erroneous admission is not reversible unless the objection was “timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground” (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a)). State the ground.

ObjectionResponse
“Hearsay; no foundation of authority under section 1222.”Offer the person most qualified’s testimony, the job description and the incident-response policy. Alternatively, ask the court to admit the statement subject to connection (Evid. Code, § 1222, subd. (b)) after a hearing outside the jury’s presence (Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (b)).
“Authority to act is not authority to speak.”Agreed, so show authority to speak: duties that include reporting or explaining incidents, rank, and the setting (O’Mary, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 570–573).
“The employee’s statement can’t prove his own authority.”Correct (Courtesy Chevrolet, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 401). Offer independent evidence of authority: testimony, policies, organization charts, the employer’s own conduct.
(Defense) “Section 1224 does not apply to respondeat superior.”Correct under Markley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 960. Move to §§ 1222, 1240 or 1230. Cite Labis only for a specific, same-day statement made while still employed.
“Section 352: unduly prejudicial.”Damaging evidence is not “undue prejudice” (O’Mary, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574–575). Offer a limiting instruction (Evid. Code, § 355).
“Lack of personal knowledge.”Show the declarant’s basis. O’Mary treated a statement outside the speaker’s knowledge differently (O’Mary, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 573).

What other routes get an employee’s statement in?

If section 1222 fails, use another exception, or simply call the employee.

Coconspirator statements (Evid. Code, § 1223) have their own foundation and rarely apply in injury cases.

Which motions in limine and jury instructions apply?

How does this play out in injury cases?

Illustrative scenarios only. Outcomes depend on the facts and the court.

Frequently asked questions

Is there a California counterpart to FRE 801(d)(2)(D)?

No. Section 1222 corresponds to rule 801(d)(2)(C), which covers authorized statements. California considered a scope-of-agency rule and did not adopt it (Crawford, supra, 239 Cal.App.2d at p. 800).

Can a driver’s “it was my fault” be used against the employer?

Not merely because the employer is vicariously liable (Markley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 960). The statement needs another route, such as section 1222 authority, a spontaneous statement under section 1240, or a declaration against interest under section 1230.

Who decides whether the employee had authority to speak?

The trial judge decides, and the ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Dart Industries, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1078). The court may admit the statement subject to later proof of authority (Evid. Code, § 1222, subd. (b)).

Related pages

About the author

David Gammill is a California trial lawyer who served seven years as a Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney and has tried more than 100 cases to verdict. He represents injured people in the South Bay and across Los Angeles County. State Bar of California No. 258286 (State Bar profile).

Trying an injury case that turns on what an employee said?

Gammill Law accepts trial referrals and co-counsel arrangements from other attorneys. See For Attorneys, contact us, or call 310-750-4149.

This page is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Verify all authority independently before relying on it in any filing. Examples are illustrative; no outcome is guaranteed.

CallFree Case Review
Ask Gammill AI Calculator