By David Gammill, Attorney
Legally reviewed: October 26, 2026 | Updated: October 26, 2026. Cases are cited to the official reports with pin cites.
Part of the California Evidence Code Practitioner Series. Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
Short answer: Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, and it is inadmissible “[e]xcept as provided by law.” (§ 1200.) California’s exceptions are mostly in sections 1220 through 1390, and there is no reliability-based catch-all. Each layer of hearsay needs its own exception. (§ 1201.) California departs from the Federal Rules of Evidence in ways that decide real objections. The biggest are medical-history statements, employee statements, present sense impressions and prior inconsistent statements.
Hearsay is “evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) states the rule: “Except as provided by law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.” “Law” includes “constitutional, statutory, and decisional law” (§ 160), and section 1205 preserves hearsay statutes outside the Evidence Code.
A “statement” is “(a) oral or written verbal expression or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression.” (§ 225.) A nod in answer to “Were you texting?” is a statement. Conduct not intended as a substitute for words is not.
The Supreme Court’s short version: “Hearsay may be briefly understood as an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of its content.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674 (Sanchez).) A statement offered for another purpose is not hearsay.
Common non-truth purposes in PI cases: notice (a customer told the store manager about the spill); effect on the listener (why the driver braked); verbal acts (the words of a warning or a contract); and impeachment. Ask for a limiting instruction under section 355 whenever a statement comes in only for one of these purposes.
Yes, technically. California treats a party’s statement as hearsay that is admissible under an exception, not as “not hearsay.” Section 1220 admits a statement “when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party.” The Federal Rules reach the same practical result by defining an opposing party’s statement as “not hearsay.” (Fed. Rules Evid., rule 801(d)(2), 28 U.S.C..)
Two consequences follow. First, a party cannot offer its own statement under section 1220, because the exception runs only “against the declarant.” Section 1240 has no such limit. If your own client’s words at the scene meet the spontaneous-statement foundation, you can offer them yourself. Second, state the ground as “Admissible under Evidence Code section 1220,” not “It’s not hearsay.”
Work through the same six questions every time, in this order:
1. Is it a statement? Words, or nonverbal conduct intended as a substitute for words. (§ 225.)
2. Is it offered for its truth? If it is offered for notice, effect on the listener, a verbal act or impeachment, it is not hearsay. Request a limiting instruction. (§ 355; CACI No. 206.)
3. Is it a party’s statement? Check sections 1220 (the party’s own), 1221 (adopted), 1222 (authorized) and 1223 (co-conspirator). Section 1224 covers derivative liability such as a surety’s or guarantor’s. It does not cover an employer sued on respondeat superior.
4. Does another exception fit? Use the master table below, and confirm whether the exception requires unavailability. (§ 240.)
5. Are there layers? Each level needs its own exception. (§ 1201.) Records, police reports and texts forwarding other people’s words usually have at least two.
6. Is an expert relating it? If an expert will tell the jury case-specific hearsay as true, Sanchez applies. See our guide to hearsay in expert testimony.
Multiple hearsay is admissible only if each statement in the chain “meets the requirements of an exception to the hearsay rule.” (§ 1201.) If one link fails, the statement fails.
The Supreme Court used a medical example. “An emergency room report, for example, may record the observations made by the writer, along with statements made by the patient.” The report “may be a business record,” while the patient’s statement “may qualify as a statement of the patient’s existing mental or physical state (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)).” “Multiple hearsay may not be admitted unless there is an exception for each level.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 674–675, citing People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 831.)
| Document | Level 1 (the document) | Level 2 (what is inside) | Typical route for level 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| ER or clinic record | § 1271 business record (§§ 1561–1562 for subpoenaed copies) | Patient’s history and complaints | § 1250 (then-existing pain or condition); § 1220 if the defense offers the plaintiff’s statement; live testimony |
| Police traffic collision report | § 1280 official record (officer’s own observations) | Driver and witness statements | § 1220 (party driver), § 1240 (spontaneous), or call the witness. Check Veh. Code, § 20013 for reports required by that division |
| Employer incident report | § 1271 business record | Employee’s account of the crash | § 1222 if the employee was authorized to speak on the subject; § 1240 if spontaneous; § 1220 against the employee if a party. Not § 1224 on respondeat superior alone (Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951, 960 (Markley)) |
| Text or email forwarding another’s words | Authentication (§§ 1400–1401) plus § 1220 if the sender is a party | The quoted words of the third person | § 1221 (adoptive admission) if the party adopted them; otherwise an independent exception |
The table lists the California exceptions that come up most in PI and wrongful-death trials, with each statute’s requirements in short form. Read the linked statute before you rely on a row.
| Section | What it admits (short form) | Declarant unavailable? | Closest Federal Rule | PI use |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| § 1220 | Statement offered against the declarant, who is a party | No | 801(d)(2)(A) | Defendant driver’s at-scene statement |
| § 1221 | Statement the party, knowing its content, adopted by words or conduct | No | 801(d)(2)(B) | Silence or agreement when accused at the scene |
| § 1222 | Statement by a person the party authorized to speak for it on the subject; foundation of authority “sufficient to sustain a finding” | No | 801(d)(2)(C) | Store manager’s or adjuster’s statements; see the §§ 1222–1224 guide |
| § 1223 | Co-conspirator statement in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong | No | 801(d)(2)(E) | Rare in PI; fraud and cover-up claims |
| § 1224 | Civil actions only: statement of a declarant whose liability, obligation or duty is the basis of the party’s, or whose breach of duty bars or diminishes the party’s claim | No | No direct counterpart; the 2024 “directly derived” sentence is closer than 801(d)(2)(D) | Derivative liability, such as a surety, guarantor or insurer answering for the declarant. Not respondeat superior (Markley). Labis v. Stopper (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1003 (Labis) is a narrow exception |
| § 1226 | Statement of a minor child offered against the plaintiff in a Code Civ. Proc., § 376 action for injury to the child | No | None | Parent’s action for a child’s injury |
| § 1227 | Decedent’s statement offered against the plaintiff in a wrongful-death action under Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60 et seq. | No | None (the 2024 “directly derived” sentence is similar in concept) | Defense use of the decedent’s own words |
| § 1230 | Statement against pecuniary, proprietary or penal interest, or one risking “hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace”; declarant had sufficient knowledge | Yes | 804(b)(3) | Absent nonparty driver or employee who admitted fault |
| § 1235 | Witness’s prior inconsistent statement, offered in compliance with § 770 | No (witness testifies) | 801(d)(1)(A) (narrower) | Recorded statement to an adjuster |
| § 1236 | Witness’s prior consistent statement, offered in compliance with § 791 | No (witness testifies) | 801(d)(1)(B) | Rehabilitation after a fabrication charge |
| § 1237 | Past recollection recorded; writing read into evidence, received as an exhibit only if an adverse party offers it | No (witness testifies) | 803(5) | Witness’s notes made when the event was fresh |
| § 1238 | Prior identification of a person who participated in “a crime or other occurrence” | No (witness testifies) | 801(d)(1)(C) | Hit-and-run driver identification |
| § 1240 | Spontaneous statement narrating an event the declarant perceived, made under the stress of excitement; either side may offer it | No | 803(2) | 911 calls, bodycam, your own client at the scene; see the §§ 1240–1241 guide |
| § 1241 | Statement explaining the declarant’s conduct, made while engaged in that conduct | No | 803(1) is broader | A driver narrating her own maneuver as she makes it |
| § 1242 | Dying declaration about the cause and circumstances of the declarant’s death, on personal knowledge, under a sense of immediately impending death | By nature | 804(b)(2) | Wrongful death |
| § 1250 | Then-existing state of mind, emotion or physical sensation, including pain; not memory or belief to prove the fact remembered (subd. (b)); subject to § 1252 | No | 803(3) | Plaintiff’s contemporaneous statements of pain |
| § 1251 | Statement of a prior state of mind or sensation, when that state is itself in issue | Yes | None directly | A declarant’s earlier condition, when that condition is itself in issue |
| § 1253 | Statements for medical diagnosis or treatment, only by a minor victim of child abuse or neglect, made when under 12 | No | 803(4) (general) | Almost never in an adult PI case |
| § 1261 | Decedent’s statement on personal knowledge, recently perceived, offered in an action on a claim against the decedent’s estate | By nature | None | Claims against a deceased tortfeasor’s estate |
| § 1271 | Business record: regular course, at or near the time, custodian or qualified witness on identity and mode of preparation, trustworthy sources and method | No | 803(6) | Medical, billing, employment and phone records; see the § 1271 guide |
| § 1272 | Absence of a business record to prove nonoccurrence | No | 803(7) | No inspection log entry |
| § 1280 | Official record: by a public employee within the scope of duty, at or near the time, trustworthy sources and method | No | 803(8) | Road maintenance logs; officer observations |
| § 1284 | Custodian’s writing reciting diligent search and no record found | No | 803(10) | No prior complaint on file |
| §§ 1291–1292 | Former testimony: § 1291 against the party who offered it before, or a prior party with a similar interest and motive; § 1292 (civil) where a party to the prior proceeding had a similar interest and motive | Yes | 804(b)(1) | Deposition or trial testimony from another case |
| § 1300 | Final judgment for “a crime punishable as a felony,” offered in a civil action to prove a fact essential to it, “whether or not” based on a nolo plea | No | 803(22) | Felony DUI driver |
| § 1302 | Final judgment against a third person, when that person’s liability is in issue | No | None directly | Derivative-liability claims |
| § 1340 | Published compilation (not opinion) generally used and relied on as accurate in business | No | 803(17) | Price lists, directories |
Depositions taken in the same action are governed mainly by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620, not the former-testimony sections. An adverse party may use the deposition of a party, or of anyone who was then the party’s “officer, director, managing agent, employee, agent, or designee,” “for any purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.620, subd. (b).)
The table lists 20 differences. The biggest: California has no residual exception, no general present-sense-impression exception, no general medical-diagnosis exception and no scope-of-employment rule for employee statements. It does admit unsworn prior inconsistent statements for their truth. Each row compares statutory text to rule text, and case law can narrow or widen either side, so treat each row as the start of your research.
| # | Issue | Federal Rules of Evidence | California Evidence Code | Practice consequence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Catch-all exception | Rule 807: residual exception for statements with sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness, with written notice | None. § 1200, subd. (b): hearsay is inadmissible “[e]xcept as provided by law” (“law” includes decisional law, § 160); § 1205 preserves exceptions in other statutes | Trustworthiness alone is not a ground. Find a statutory or case-law exception, or call the declarant |
| 2 | Present sense impression | Rule 803(1): statement describing an event “made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it” | § 1241 only: a statement explaining the declarant’s own conduct, made while engaged in it. Otherwise § 1240 requires stress of excitement | A calm bystander’s narration (“the blue car just ran the red”) needs § 1240 excitement or live testimony |
| 3 | Medical diagnosis or treatment | Rule 803(4): statements made for and reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, including history and “general cause” | § 1253 applies only to a minor victim of child abuse or neglect, for statements made when under 12. No general exception | An adult plaintiff’s history in a chart needs § 1250, § 1220 (defense use) or live testimony, with an exception for each layer (§ 1201) |
| 4 | Employee or agent statements | Rule 801(d)(2)(D): statement by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship | § 1222 only: a person the party authorized to speak on the subject. § 1224 does not fill this gap in respondeat superior cases (Markley) | Prove speaking authority, or use § 1240, § 1230, § 1220 (employee co-defendant, with a § 355 instruction), § 1221, or the employee’s deposition (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.620, subd. (b)) |
| 5 | Successor or derivative parties | Rule 801(d)(2) (amended Dec. 1, 2024): statement admissible against a party whose claim, defense or liability “is directly derived from” the declarant or the declarant’s principal | § 1224 (privity-type derivative liability, such as surety or guarantor, per Markley), § 1225 (property interests), § 1227 (decedent’s statements against a wrongful-death plaintiff) | Check fit section by section. Neither the 2024 sentence nor § 1224 admits an employee’s statement merely because the employer is vicariously liable |
| 6 | Prior inconsistent statements | Rule 801(d)(1)(A): substantive only if given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, other proceeding or deposition | § 1235: any inconsistent statement, offered in compliance with § 770, comes in for its truth | An unsworn statement to an adjuster or officer is substantive evidence |
| 7 | Prior consistent statements | Rule 801(d)(1)(B): (i) rebut recent fabrication or improper motive, or (ii) rehabilitate when attacked on “another ground” | §§ 1236, 791: only after an inconsistent statement (if the consistent one came first), or to meet a fabrication, bias or motive charge (if made before the motive arose) | No California counterpart to the Federal Rules’ “another ground” clause |
| 8 | Prior identification | Rule 801(d)(1)(C): identifies a person the declarant perceived earlier | § 1238: identification of a participant in “a crime or other occurrence,” made while fresh; the witness testifies he made it and that it was true | Lay the extra foundation through the witness |
| 9 | How party statements are classified | Rule 801(d)(2): “not hearsay” | §§ 1220–1227: hearsay exceptions | State the section as the ground |
| 10 | Business records | Rule 803(6): covers “opinion, or diagnosis”; foundation by witness or certification under Rule 902(11)/(12); the opponent must show untrustworthiness | § 1271: “act, condition, or event”; the proponent shows trustworthy “sources of information and method and time of preparation.” Subpoenaed copies: affidavit under §§ 1561–1562 | Check case law before offering diagnoses or opinions in records. See the § 1271 guide |
| 11 | Public records | Rule 803(8): in civil cases, includes “factual findings from a legally authorized investigation” | § 1280: record “of an act, condition, or event” by a public employee within the scope of duty, at or near the time, trustworthy | Officer conclusions in a collision report are a separate fight; also check Veh. Code, § 20013 |
| 12 | Former testimony | Rule 804(b)(1): civil cases require that the opponent or its “predecessor in interest” had an opportunity and similar motive | § 1292 (civil): a party to the prior proceeding had an interest and motive similar to the current opponent’s, even if the current opponent was not a party | Testimony from a related case can come in against a new defendant |
| 13 | Statements against interest | Rule 804(b)(3): pecuniary, proprietary, claim-invalidating or liability-exposing; corroboration required for penal-interest statements in criminal cases | § 1230 adds a statement that risks making the declarant “an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community” | Broader category in California, but still limited to the disserving portion (People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 612 (Duarte)) |
| 14 | Unavailability: memory loss | Rule 804(a)(3): a declarant who “testifies to not remembering” is unavailable | § 240 has no express memory-loss ground | Research before relying on memory loss as unavailability |
| 15 | Unavailability: effort required | Rule 804(a)(5)(B): for dying declarations, statements against interest and family history, the proponent must also try to obtain the declarant’s “testimony” (e.g., a deposition) | § 240, subd. (a)(5): “reasonable diligence” to procure attendance “by the court’s process” | Build a diligence record focused on attendance; the statute has no separate deposition-attempt requirement |
| 16 | Dying declarations | Rule 804(b)(2): homicide prosecutions and civil cases; declarant believed death imminent; declarant unavailable | § 1242: statement by “a dying person respecting the cause and circumstances of his death,” on personal knowledge, under a sense of “immediately impending death”; no case-type limit | Available in wrongful-death cases under both systems |
| 17 | Prior criminal judgments | Rule 803(22): excludes judgments based on a nolo contendere plea | § 1300: felony judgments admissible “whether or not” based on a nolo plea. For non-felonies, Pen. Code, § 1016, subd. 3 bars use of a nolo plea as an admission in a related civil suit | A felony DUI nolo plea can prove essential facts; a misdemeanor nolo plea cannot be used as an admission |
| 18 | Learned treatises | Rule 803(18): statements in reliable treatises are a hearsay exception when used with an expert | No Division 10 counterpart. § 721, subd. (b) limits cross-examination with publications; relevant portions “may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits” | Do not expect a treatise to come in for its truth |
| 19 | Impeaching a hearsay declarant | Rule 806: attack and support as if the declarant testified; no opportunity to explain needed | § 1202: same, and a deponent in the action is “deemed to be a hearsay declarant.” § 1203: the adverse party may call the declarant as if under cross-examination (with exceptions) | Impeach an absent deponent with inconsistent statements without a § 770 foundation |
| 20 | Then-existing condition | Rule 803(3): excludes memory or belief except about the declarant’s will | § 1250, subd. (b): same exclusion; § 1252: excluded if made under circumstances indicating lack of trustworthiness; § 1251: prior state if unavailable | Offer “my neck hurts,” not “my neck hurts because he hit me” |
Unavailability under section 240 is an element of the exceptions for declarations against interest (§ 1230), prior state of mind (§ 1251), statements about wills and trusts (§ 1260) and former testimony (§§ 1291, 1292). Most other exceptions apply whether or not the declarant can testify.
A declarant is unavailable if privileged, disqualified, dead, or unable to attend or testify because of then-existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. A declarant is also unavailable if beyond the court’s process, or absent despite “reasonable diligence” to procure attendance “by the court’s process.” Persistent refusal to testify despite a contempt finding also qualifies. (§ 240, subd. (a)(1)–(6).) A proponent who procured the unavailability to prevent testimony cannot rely on it. (§ 240, subd. (b).)
Practice tip: keep a dated diligence log from the first failed service attempt: addresses tried, skip-trace results, subpoenas issued and process server declarations.
The judge decides most exception foundations; the jury decides some threshold facts. Section 405 governs preliminary facts not covered by section 403 or 404. The court determines them and admits or excludes “as required by the rule of law under which the question arises.” Section 403 applies when the question is relevance, personal knowledge, authenticity, or whether a particular person made the statement. There the proponent need only produce “evidence sufficient to sustain a finding.”
| Preliminary question | Standard | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Was the declarant still under the stress of excitement (§ 1240)? | Court decides | People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318 (Poggi) (“vested in the court, not the jury”); § 405 |
| Did this defendant make the statement? | Evidence sufficient to sustain a finding | § 403, subd. (a)(4) |
| Is the recording or document authentic? | Evidence sufficient to sustain a finding | § 403, subd. (a)(3); § 1400 |
| Was the declarant authorized to speak for the party (§ 1222)? | Evidence sufficient to sustain a finding; order of proof in the court’s discretion | § 1222, subd. (b) |
| Was there a conspiracy, and did the party join it (§ 1223)? | Evidence sufficient to sustain a finding | § 1223, subd. (c) |
Ask for a hearing outside the jury’s presence under section 402, subdivision (b) when foundation is contested. A ruling “implies whatever finding of fact is prerequisite thereto” (§ 402, subd. (c)), so make your record before the ruling.
Show that the statement narrates something the declarant perceived and was made spontaneously while under the stress of excitement that perception caused. (§ 1240.) The Supreme Court’s three-part formulation, quoted from Showalter v. Western Pacific R.R. Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 460, 468, requires an occurrence “startling enough to produce this nervous excitement.” The utterance must come “before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent,” and it must relate “to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.” (Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
Timing and questioning are factors, not bars: “Neither lapse of time between the event and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance.” (Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 319, quoting People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176.) In Poggi, statements made about 30 minutes after the attack, in response to an officer’s questions, were upheld. (Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 319.)
Either side may offer a spontaneous statement. A plaintiff’s own excited words at the scene can come in on the plaintiff’s offer, which section 1220 does not allow. For foundation questions, the 911-authentication sequence and the section 1241 contrast, see the §§ 1240–1241 spontaneous statements guide.
Not through a medical-diagnosis exception, because California has none outside section 1253’s child-abuse context. The chart itself may be a business record (§ 1271), but the patient’s statements inside it are a second level of hearsay (§ 1201). Use one of these routes:
The records foundation itself (a live custodian, the section 1561 affidavit and the section 1562 presumption) is covered in the § 1271 business records guide. For billed-versus-paid evidence in the same records, see the Howell medical damages guide.
Only through an exception that fits on its own terms. California has no scope-of-employment admission rule like Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 801(d)(2)(D). Section 1222 admits an employee’s statement only if the employer authorized the employee “to make a statement or statements for him concerning the subject matter of the statement.” (§ 1222, subd. (a).) Section 1224 does not make a driver’s statement admissible against the employer merely because the employer is vicariously liable. The Supreme Court held that “liability, obligation, or duty” in that section does “not include tort liabilities of employees that are imputed to their employers under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” (Markley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 960; see id. at p. 959.)
Markley reads section 1224 as reaching privity-type relationships, such as a guarantor, surety or insurer answering for the declarant’s obligation. (Markley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 959–960.) Look instead to these routes:
| Route | What you must show | Typical PI facts |
|---|---|---|
| § 1222 | Authority to speak for the employer on the subject, by evidence “sufficient to sustain a finding” | Store manager’s incident statement; safety director’s account; adjuster’s letter |
| § 1240 | Spontaneous statement under the stress of the event | Driver’s “I didn’t see her” moments after the crash |
| § 1230 | Declarant unavailable; statement against interest when made; only the specifically disserving portion | Former employee who admitted fault and cannot be found |
| § 1220 with § 355 | The employee is a co-defendant; the statement comes in against the employee, with a limiting instruction for the employer (CACI No. 207) | Driver and carrier both named |
| § 1221 | The employer, knowing the content, adopted the statement by words or conduct | A supervisor repeats or endorses the driver’s account |
| Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.620, subd. (b) | Deposition of a party’s “employee” or “agent” at the time of the deposition, used by an adverse party “for any purpose” | Depose the driver while still employed |
Labis admitted a painter’s statement against his employer under section 1224 on narrow facts. The statement was specific and detailed, and it was made to an investigating police officer about three hours after the fall, while the painter was still on the job. (Labis, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1004–1005.) The court declined to “broaden [Markley‘s] language beyond its holding.” (Id. at p. 1005.) Do not read Labis as a general employee-statement rule; build one of the foundations above. Foundation scripts are in the §§ 1222–1224 guide.
Yes. Under section 1202, an inconsistent statement or conduct of a hearsay declarant “is not inadmissible for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the declarant though he is not given and has not had an opportunity to explain or to deny” it. Other impeachment is allowed if it “would have been admissible had the declarant been a witness.”
Two details lawyers miss. First, “the deponent of a deposition taken in the action in which it is offered shall be deemed to be a hearsay declarant.” (§ 1202.) Second, an adverse party may call the declarant of an admitted hearsay statement and examine “as if under cross-examination.” (§ 1203.) That right does not apply if the declarant is a party, a person identified with a party under section 776, subdivision (d), or a witness who already testified on the subject. Section 1203 also does not apply to admissions, prior statements of witnesses or judgments. (§ 1203, subd. (c).)
State the specific ground, because section 353 requires an objection “so stated as to make clear the specific ground.” These pairs are models to adapt:
| Objection | Response |
|---|---|
| “Hearsay, Evidence Code section 1200.” | “Not offered for its truth; offered to show notice to the defendant. We request a limiting instruction under section 355.” |
| “Hearsay.” | “Offered against a party-declarant under section 1220.” |
| “Hearsay within hearsay, section 1201.” | “The record is a business record under section 1271; the patient’s statement of present pain is admissible under section 1250.” |
| “No foundation of authority under section 1222.” | “We offer the store manager’s job description and PMQ testimony; alternatively, we ask the court to admit it subject to that evidence under section 1222, subdivision (b).” |
| “Section 1224 does not apply to respondeat superior.” | “Agreed, under Markley. We offer it as a spontaneous statement under section 1240 and request a 402 hearing.” |
| “Narrative after reflection; not spontaneous under section 1240.” | “Timing is not dispositive. The 911 audio shows the declarant crying and out of breath. People v. Poggi, 45 Cal.3d at page 319. We request a 402 hearing.” |
| “Statement of memory or belief, section 1250, subdivision (b).” | “We limit the offer to the then-existing sensation and will redact the cause narrative.” |
| “Section 1230: declarant not shown unavailable.” | “The investigator’s diligence declaration and process attempts show unavailability under section 240, subdivision (a)(5).” |
| “Collateral, self-serving portions, section 1230.” | “We offer only the specifically disserving portion, redacted. People v. Duarte, 24 Cal.4th at page 612.” |
| “Improper impeachment, no section 770 foundation.” | “The witness has not been excused and remains subject to recall. Section 770, subdivision (b).” |
| (If you lose an exclusion ruling) | Make an offer of proof of “the substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence.” (§ 354, subd. (a).) |
Object timely and specifically, move to strike when an answer comes in first, make an offer of proof when evidence is excluded, and ask for a limiting instruction when evidence comes in for one purpose.
Use motions in limine to get foundation rulings before opening statements and to keep inadmissible layers away from the jury. Model headings to adapt:
| Case | Point | Use it for |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674–675 | Definition of hearsay; documents can contain multiple levels; “an exception for each level” | Medical records and police reports with embedded statements; expert basis (see the Sanchez guide) |
| People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318–319 | Three-part spontaneous-statement test; the court decides; lapse of time and questioning not dispositive | 911 calls and bodycam statements |
| People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610–612 | Section 1230 elements; only the “specifically disserving” portion is admissible | Redacting a nonparty’s admission of fault |
| Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951, 959–960 | Section 1224 does not reach tort liability imputed under respondeat superior | Opposing or anticipating a § 1224 offer against an employer |
| Labis v. Stopper (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1004–1005 | Narrow § 1224 admission on specific facts | Know it, but do not build the offer on it |
| Yaffee v. Skeen (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1318 | Failure to move to strike an expert’s hearsay-based testimony forfeits the issue (§ 353) | Preserving a Sanchez objection |
Does California have a residual or catch-all hearsay exception? No. The Evidence Code has no counterpart to Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 807. Hearsay is inadmissible “[e]xcept as provided by law” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b)), so the proponent must point to a specific statutory or decisional exception.
Does California have a medical diagnosis or treatment hearsay exception? Only for a minor victim of child abuse or neglect, for statements made when under 12 (Evid. Code, § 1253). For adult PI plaintiffs, use section 1250, section 1220 or live testimony.
Is an employee’s statement admissible against the employer because the employer is vicariously liable? No. Section 1224 does not reach tort liability imputed under respondeat superior (Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951, 960). Use section 1222 (authorized statements), section 1240, section 1230, or the employee’s deposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.620.
Is an unsworn prior inconsistent statement admissible for its truth in California? Yes, under Evidence Code section 1235, if offered in compliance with section 770.
David Gammill is a California trial lawyer who served seven years as a Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney and has tried more than 100 cases to verdict. He represents injured people in the South Bay and across Los Angeles County. State Bar of California No. 258286 (State Bar profile).
Gammill Law works with other lawyers as trial counsel, as co-counsel, and on referred personal injury, wrongful death and civil rights cases. Any fee division is handled in writing under California Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5.1, with the client’s written consent. To talk through an evidentiary issue on a case you may refer or co-counsel, call 310-750-4149 and ask for David Gammill, or see For Attorneys.
This page is general educational material for lawyers, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Statutes and case law change; verify current law and the Official Reports before relying on any statement here.